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Abstract
As human computation on crowdsourcing systems has be-
come popular and powerful for performing tasks, malicious
users have started misusing these systems by posting ma-
licious tasks, propagating manipulated contents, and target-
ing popular web services such as online social networks and
search engines. Recently, these malicious users moved to
Fiverr, a fast-growing micro-task marketplace, where work-
ers can post crowdturfing tasks (i.e., astroturfing campaigns
run by crowd workers) and malicious customers can pur-
chase those tasks for only $5. In this paper, we present a
comprehensive analysis of Fiverr. First, we identify the most
popular types of crowdturfing tasks found in this market-
place and conduct case studies for these crowdturfing tasks.
Then, we build crowdturfing task detection classifiers to fil-
ter these tasks and prevent them from becoming active in
the marketplace. Our experimental results show that the pro-
posed classification approach effectively detects crowdturf-
ing tasks, achieving 97.35% accuracy. Finally, we analyze the
real world impact of crowdturfing tasks by purchasing active
Fiverr tasks and quantifying their impact on a target site. As
part of this analysis, we show that current security systems
inadequately detect crowdsourced manipulation, which con-
firms the necessity of our proposed crowdturfing task detec-
tion approach.
Introduction
Crowdsourcing systems are becoming more and more pop-
ular because they can quickly accomplish tasks that are
difficult for computers but easy for humans. For exam-
ple, a word document can be summarized and proofread
by crowd workers while the document is still being writ-
ten by its author (Bernstein et al. 2010), and missing data
in database systems can be populated by crowd work-
ers (Franklin et al. 2011). As the popularity of crowdsourc-
ing has increased, various systems have emerged – from
general-purpose crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk, Crowdflower and Fiverr, to specialized
systems such as Ushahidi (for crisis information) and Foldit
(for protein folding).
These systems offer numerous positive benefits because
they efficiently distribute jobs to a workforce of willing indi-
viduals. However, malicious customers and unethical work-
ers have started misusing these systems, spreading mali-
cious URLs in social media, posting fake reviews and rat-
ings, forming artificial grassroots campaigns, and manipu-
lating search engines (e.g., creating numerous backlinks to
targeted pages and artificially increasing user traffic). Re-
cently, news media reported that 1,000 crowdturfers – work-
ers performing crowdturfing tasks on behalf of buyers – were
hired by Vietnamese propaganda officials to post comments
that supported the government (Pham 2013), and the “In-
ternet water army” in China created an artificial campaign
to advertise an online computer game (Chen et al. 2011;
Sterling 2010). These types of crowdsourced manipulations
reduce the quality of online social media, degrade trust in
search engines, manipulate political opinion, and eventu-
ally threaten the security and trustworthiness of online web
services. Recent studies found that ∼90% of all tasks in
crowdsourcing sites were for “crowdturfing” – astroturfing
campaigns run by crowd workers on behalf of customers
– (Wang et al. 2012), and most malicious tasks in crowd-
sourcing systems target either online social networks (56%)
or search engines (33%) (Lee, Tamilarasan, and Caverlee
2013).
Unfortunately, very little is known about the properties of
crowdturfing tasks, their impact on the web ecosystem, or
how to detect and prevent them. Hence, in this paper we are
interested in analyzing Fiverr – a fast growing micro-task
marketplace and the 125th most popular site (Alexa 2013) –
to be the first to answer the following questions: what are the
most important characteristics of buyers (a.k.a. customers)
and sellers (a.k.a. workers)? What types of tasks, includ-
ing crowdturfing tasks, are available? What sites do crowd-
turfers target? How much do they earn? Based on this anal-
ysis and the corresponding observations, can we automat-
ically detect these crowdturfing tasks? Can we measure the
impact of these crowdturfing tasks? Can current security sys-
tems in targeted sites adequately detect crowdsourced ma-
nipulation?
To answer these questions, we make the following contri-
butions in this paper:
• First, we collect a large number of active tasks (these are
called gigs in Fiverr) from all categories in Fiverr. Then,
we analyze the properties of buyers and sellers as well
as the types of crowdturfing tasks found in this market-
place. To our knowledge, this is the first study to focus
primarily on Fiverr.
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• Second, we conduct a statistical analysis of the proper-
ties of crowdturfing and legitimate tasks, and we build
a machine learning based crowdturfing task classifier to
actively filter out these existing and new malicious tasks,
preventing propagation of crowdsourced manipulation to
other web sites. To our knowledge this is the first study
to detect crowdturfing tasks automatically.
• Third, we feature case studies of three specific types of
crowdturfing tasks: social media targeting gigs, search
engine targeting gigs and user traffic targeting gigs.
• Finally, we purchase active crowdturfing tasks targeting
a popular social media site, Twitter, and measure the
impact of these tasks to the targeted site. We then test
how many crowdsourced manipulations Twitter’s secu-
rity can detect, and confirm the necessity of our proposed
crowdturfing detection approach.
Background
Fiverr is a micro-task marketplace where users can buy and
sell services, which are called gigs. The site has over 1.7
million registered users, and it has listed more than 2 million
gigs1. As of November 2013, it is the 125th most visited site
in the world according to Alexa (Alexa 2013).
Fiverr gigs do not exist in other e-commerce sites, and
some of them are humorous (e.g., “I will paint a logo on
my back” and “I will storyboard your script”). In the mar-
ketplace, a buyer purchases a gig from a seller (the default
purchase price is $5). A user can be a buyer and/or a seller.
A buyer can post a review about the gig and the correspond-
ing seller. Each seller can be promoted to a 1st level seller,
a 2nd level seller, or a top level seller by selling more gigs.
Higher level sellers can sell additional features (called “gig
extras”) for a higher price (i.e., more than $5). For exam-
ple, one seller offers the following regular gig: “I will write
a high quality 100 to 300 word post,article,etc under 36 hrs
free editing for $5”. For an additional $10, she will “make
the gig between 600 to 700 words in length”, and for an ad-
ditional $20, she will “make the gig between 800 to 1000
words in length”. By selling these extra gigs, the promoted
seller can earn more money. Each user also has a profile page
that displays the user’s bio, location, reviews, seller level,
gig titles (i.e., the titles of registered services), and number
of sold gigs.
Figure 1 shows an example of a gig listing
on Fiverr. The listing’s human-readable URL is
http://Fiverr.com/hdsmith7674/write-a-high-quality-100-to-
300-word-postarticleetc-under-36-hrs-free-editing, which
was automatically created by Fiverr based on the title of the
gig. The user name is “hdsmith7674”, and the user is a top
rated seller.
Ultimately, there are two types of Fiverr sellers: (1) legit-
imate sellers and (2) unethical (malicious) sellers, as shown
in Figure 2. Legitimate sellers post legitimate gigs that do
not harm other users or other web sites. Examples of le-
gitimate gigs are “I will color your logo” and “I will sing
1http://blog.Fiverr/2013/08/12/fiverr-community-milestone-
two-million-reasons-to-celebrate-iamfiverr/
Figure 1: An example of a Fiverr gig listing.
a punkrock happy birthday”. On the other hand, unethical
sellers post crowdturfing gigs on Fiverr that target sites such
as online social networks and search engines. Examples of
crowdturfing gigs are “I will provide 2000+ perfect looking
twitter followers” and “I will create 2,000 Wiki Backlinks”.
These gigs are clearly used to manipulate their targeted sites
and provide an unfair advantage for their buyers.
Fiverr Characterization
In this section, we present our data collection methodology.
Then, we measure the number of the active Fiverr gig list-
ings and estimate the number of listings that have ever been
created. Finally, we analyze the characteristics of Fiverr buy-
ers and sellers.
Dataset
To collect gig listings, we built a custom Fiverr crawler. This
crawler initially visited the Fiverr homepage and extracted
its embedded URLs for gig listings. Then, the crawler visited
each of those URLs and extracted new URLs for gig listings
using a depth-first search. By doing this process, the crawler
accessed and downloaded each gig listing from all of the gig
categories between July and August 2013. From each list-
ing, we also extracted the URL of the associated seller and
downloaded the corresponding profile. Overall, we collected
89,667 gig listings and 31,021 corresponding user profiles.
Gig Analysis
First, we will analyze the gig listings in our dataset and an-
swer relevant questions.
How much data was covered? We attempted to collect ev-
ery active gig listing from every gig category in Fiverr. To
check how many active listings we collected, we used a
sampling approach. When a listing is created, Fiverr inter-
nally assigns a sequentially increasing numerical id to the
gig. For example, the first created listing received 1 as the
id, and the second listing received 2. Using this number
scheme, we can access a listing using the following URL for-
mat: http://Fiverr.com/[GIG NUMERICAL ID], which will
be redirected to the human-readable URL that is automati-
cally assigned based on the gig’s title.
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Figure 2: The interactions between buyers and legitimate sellers on Fiverr, contrasted with the interactions between buyers and
unethical sellers.
Figure 3: Total number of created gigs over time.
As part of our sampling approach, we sampled 1,000
gigs whose assigned id numbers are between 1,980,000
and 1,980,999 (e.g., http://Fiverr.com/1980000). Then, we
checked how many of those gigs are still active because gigs
are often paused or deleted. 615 of the 1,000 gigs were still
active. Next, we crossreferenced these active listings with
our dataset to see how many listings overlapped. Our dataset
contained 517 of the 615 active listings, and based on this
analysis, we can approximate that our dataset covered 84%
of the active gigs on Fiverr. This analysis also shows that gig
listings can become stale quickly due to frequent pauses and
deletions.
Initially, we attempted to collect listings using gig id num-
bers (e.g., http://Fiverr.com/1980000), but Fiverr’s Safety
Team blocked our computers’ IP addresses because access-
ing the id-based URLs is not officially supported by the site.
To abide by the site’s policies, we used the human-readable
URLs, and as our sampling approach shows, we still col-
lected a significant number of active Fiverr gig listings.
How many gigs have been created over time? A gig listing
contains the gig’s numerical id and its creation time, which is
displayed as days, months, or years. Based on this informa-
tion, we can measure how many gigs have been created over
time. In Figure 3, we plotted the approximate total number
of gigs that have been created each year. The graph follows
the exponential distribution in macro-scale (again, yearly)
even though the micro-scaled plot may show us a clearer
growth rate. This plot shows that Fiverr has been getting
more popular, and in August 2013, the site reached 2 mil-
lion listed gigs.
User Analysis
Next, we will analyze the characteristics of Fiverr buyers
and sellers in the dataset.
Where are sellers from? Are the sellers distributed all
over the world? In previous research, sellers (i.e., workers)
in other crowdsourcing sites were usually from developing
countries (Lee, Tamilarasan, and Caverlee 2013). To deter-
mine if Fiverr has the same demographics, Figure 4(a) shows
the distribution of sellers on the world map. Sellers are from
168 countries, and surprisingly, the largest group of sellers
are from the United States (39.4% of the all sellers), which
is very different from other sites. The next largest group of
sellers is from India (10.3%), followed by the United King-
dom (6.2%), Canada (3.4%), Pakistan (2.8%), Bangladesh
(2.6%), Indonesia (2.4%), Sri Lanka (2.2%), Philippines
(2%), and Australia (1.6%). Overall, the majority of sellers
(50.6%) were from the western countries.
What is Fiverr’s market size? We analyzed the distribu-
tion of purchased gigs in our dataset and found that a total
of 4,335,253 gigs were purchased from the 89,667 unique
listings. In other words, the 31,021 users in our dataset sold
more than 4.3 million gigs and earned at least $21.6 mil-
lion, assuming each gig’s price was $5. Since some gigs
cost more than $5 (due to gig extras), the total gig-related
revenue is probably even higher. Obviously, Fiverr is a huge
marketplace, but where are the buyers coming from? Fig-
ure 4(b) shows the distribution of sold gigs on the world
map. Gigs were bought from all over the world (208 to-
(a) Distribution of sellers in the world map. (b) Distribution of buyers in the world map.
Figure 4: Distribution of all sellers and buyers in the world map.
Table 1: Top 10 sellers.
Username |Sold Gigs| Eared (Minimum) |Gigs| Gig Category Crowdturfing
crorkservice 601,210 3,006,050 29 Online Marketing yes
dino stark 283,420 1,417,100 3 Online Marketing yes
volarex 173,030 865,150 15 Online Marketing and Advertising yes
alanletsgo 171,240 856,200 29 Business, Advertising and Online Marketing yes
portron 167,945 839,725 3 Online Marketing yes
mikemeth 149,090 745,450 19 Online Marketing, Business, Advertising yes
actualreviewnet 125,530 627,650 6 Graphics & Design, Gift and Fun & Bizarre no
bestoftwitter 123,725 618,625 8 Online Marketing and Advertising yes
amazesolutions 99,890 499,450 1 Online Marketing yes
sarit11 99,320 496,600 2 Online Marketing yes
tal countries), and the largest number of gigs (53.6% of the
4,335,253 sold gigs) were purchased by buyers in the United
States. The next most frequent buyers are the United King-
dom (10.3%), followed by Canada (5.5%), Australia (5.2%),
and India (1.7%). Based on this analysis, the majority of the
gigs were purchased by the western countries.
Who are the top sellers? The top 10 sellers are listed
in Table 1. Amazingly, one seller (crorkservice) has sold
601,210 gigs and earned at least $3 million over the past 2
years. In other words, one user from Moldova has earned at
least $1.5 million/year, which is orders of magnitude larger
than $2,070, the GNI (Gross National Income) per capita
of Moldova (Bank 2013). Even the 10th highest seller has
earned almost $500,000. Another interesting observation is
that 9 of the top 10 sellers have had multiple gigs that were
categorized as online marketing, advertising, or business.
The most popular category of these gigs was online mar-
keting.
We carefully investigated the top sellers’ gig descriptions
to identify which gigs they offered and sold to buyers. Gigs
provided by the top sellers (except actualreviewnet) are all
crowdturfing tasks, which require sellers to manipulate a
web page’s PageRank score, artificially propagate a message
through a social network, or artificially add friends to a so-
cial networking account. This observation indicates that de-
spite the positive aspects of Fiverr, some sellers and buyers
have abused the micro-task marketplace, and these crowd-
turfing tasks have become the most popular gigs. These
crowdturfing tasks threaten the entire web ecosystem be-
cause they degrade the trustworthiness of information. Other
researchers have raised similar concerns about crowdturf-
ing problems and concluded that these artificial manipula-
tions should be detected and prevented (Wang et al. 2012;
Lee, Tamilarasan, and Caverlee 2013). However, previous
work has not studied how to detect these tasks. For the
remainder of this paper, we will analyze and detect these
crowdturfing tasks in Fiverr.
Analyzing and Detecting Crowdturfing Gigs
In the previous section, we observed that top sellers have
earned millions of dollars by selling crowdturfing gigs.
Based on this observation, we now turn our attention to
studying these crowdturfing gigs in detail and automatically
detect them.
Data Labeling and 3 Types of Crowdturfing Gigs
To understand what percentage of gigs in our dataset are
associated with crowdturfing, we randomly selected 1,550
out of the 89,667 gigs and labeled them as a legitimate
or crowdturfing task. Table 2 presents the labeled distribu-
tion of gigs across 12 top level gig categories predefined by
Fiverr. 121 of the 1,550 gigs (6%) were crowdturfing tasks,
which is a significant percentage of the micro-task market-
place. Among these crowdturfing tasks, most of them were
Table 2: Labeled data of randomly selected 1,550 gigs.
Category |Gigs| |Crowdturfing| Crowdtufing%
Advertising 99 4 4%
Business 51 1 2%
Fun&Bizarre 81 0 0%
Gifts 67 0 0%
Graphics&Design 347 1 0.3%
Lifestyle 114 0 0%
Music&Audio 123 0 0%
Online Marketing 206 114 55.3%
Other 20 0 0
Programming... 84 0 0
Video&Animation 201 0 0
Writing&Trans... 157 1 0.6%
Total 1,550 121 6%
categorized as online marketing. In fact, 55.3% of all online
marketing gigs in the sample data were crowdturfing tasks.
Next, we manually categorized the 121 crowdturfing gigs
into three groups: (1) social media targeting gigs, (2) search
engine targeting gigs, and (3) user traffic targeting gigs. 65
of the 121 crowdturfing gigs targeted social media sites such
as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. The gig sellers know that
buyers want to have more friends or followers on these sites,
promote their messages or URLs, and increase the number
of views associated with their videos. The buyers expect
these manipulation to result in more effective information
propagation, higher conversion rates, and positive social sig-
nals for their web pages and products.
Another group of gigs (47 of the 121 crowdturfing gigs)
targeted search engines by artificially creating backlinks for
a targeted site. This is a traditional attack against search en-
gines. However, instead of creating backlinks on their own,
the buyers take advantage of sellers to create a large number
of backlinks so that the targeted page will receive a higher
PageRank score (and have a better chance of ranking at the
top of search results). The top seller in Table 1 (crorkservice)
has sold search engine targeting gigs and earned $3 million
with 100% positive ratings and more than 47,000 positive
comments from buyers who purchased the gigs. This fact
indicates that the search engine targeting gigs are popular
and profitable.
The last gig group (9 of the 121 crowdturfing gigs)
claimed to pass user traffic to a targeted site. Sellers in this
group know that buyers want to generate user traffic (visi-
tors) for a pre-selected web site or web page. With higher
traffic, the buyers hope to abuse Google AdSense, which
provides advertisements on each buyer’s web page, when the
visitors click the advertisements. Another goal of purchasing
these traffic gigs is for the visitors to purchase products from
the pre-selected page.
To this point, we have analyzed the labeled crowdturfing
gigs and identified monetization as the primary motivation
for purchasing these gigs. By abusing the web ecosystem
with crowd-based manipulations, buyers attempt to maxi-
mize their profits. In the next section, we will develop an
approach to detect these crowdturfing gigs automatically.
Table 3: Confusion matrix
Predicted
Crowdturfing Legitimate
Actual Crowdturfing Gig a b
Legit Gig c d
Detecting Crowdturfing Gigs
Automatically detecting crowdturfing gigs is an important
task because it allows us to remove the gigs before buyers
can purchase them, and eventually, it will allow us to pro-
hibit sellers from posting these gigs. To detect crowdturfing
gigs, we built machine-learned models using the manually
labeled 1,550 gig dataset.
The performance of a classifier depends on the quality of
features, which have distinguishing power between crowd-
turfing gigs and legitimate gigs in this context. Our feature
set consists of the title of a gig, the gig’s description, a top
level category, a second level category (each gig is catego-
rized to a top level and then a second level – e.g., “online
marketing” as the top level and “social marketing” as the
second level), ratings associated with a gig, the number of
votes for a gig, a gig’s longevity, a seller’s response time for
a gig request, a seller’s country, seller longevity, seller level
(e.g., top level seller or 2nd level seller), a world domina-
tion rate (the number of countries where buyers of the gig
were from, divided by the total number of countries), and
distribution of buyers by country (e.g., entropy and standard
deviation). For the title and job description of a gig, we con-
verted these texts into bag-of-word models in which each
distinct word becomes a feature. We also used tf-idf to mea-
sure values for these text features.
To understand which feature has distinguishing power be-
tween crowdturfing gigs and legitimate gigs, we measured
the chi-square of the features. The most interesting features
among the top features, based on chi-square, are category
features (top level and second level), a world domination
rate, and bag-of-words features such as “link”, “backlink”,
“follow”, “twitter”, “rank”, “traffic”, and “bookmark”.
Since we don’t know which machine learning algorithm
(or classifier) would perform best in this domain, we tried
over 30 machine learning algorithms such as Naive Bayes,
Support Vector Machine (SVM), and tree-based algorithms
by using the Weka machine learning toolkit with default val-
ues for all parameters (Witten and Frank 2005). We used
10-fold cross-validation, which means the dataset contain-
ing 1,550 gigs was divided into 10 sub-samples. For a given
classification experiment using a single classifier, each sub-
sample becomes a testing set, and the other 9 sub-samples
become a training set. We completed a classification experi-
ment for each of the 10 pairs of training and testing sets, and
we averaged the 10 classification results. We repeated this
process for each machine learning algorithm.
We compute precision, recall, F-measure, accuracy, false
positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) as metrics
to evaluate our classifiers. In the confusion matrix, Table 3,
a represents the number of correctly classified crowdturf-
ing gigs, b (called FNs) represents the number of crowd-
turfing gigs misclassified as legitimate gigs, c (called FPs)
represents the number of legitimate gigs misclassified as
crowdturfing gigs, and d represents the number of cor-
rectly classified legitimate gigs. The precision (P) of the
crowdturfing gig class is a/(a+ c) in the table. The re-
call (R) of the crowdturfing gig is a/(a+ b). F1 measure
of the crowdturfing gig class is 2PR/(P +R). The ac-
curacy means the fraction of correct classifications and is
(a+ d)/(a+ b+ c+ d).
Overall, SVM outperformed the other classification al-
gorithms. Its classification result is shown in Table 4. It
achieved 97.35% accuracy, 0.974 F1, 0.008 FPR, and 0.248
FNR. This positive result shows that our classification ap-
proach works well and that it is possible to automatically
detect crowdturfing gigs.
Table 4: SVM-based classification result
Accuracy F1 FPR FNR
97.35% 0.974 0.008 0.248
Detecting Crowdturfing Gigs in the Wild and
Case Studies
In this section, we apply our classification approach to a
large dataset to find new crowdturfing gigs and conduct case
studies of the crowdturfing gigs in detail.
Newly Detected Crowdturfing Gigs
In this study, we detect crowdturfing gigs in the wild, ana-
lyze newly detected crowdturfing gigs, and categorize each
crowdturfing gig to one of the three crowdturfing types (so-
cial media targeting gig, search engine targeting gig, or user
traffic targeting gig) revealed in the previous section.
First, we trained our SVM-based classifier with the 1,550
labeled gigs, using the same features as the previous exper-
iment in the previous section. However, unlike the previous
experiment, we used all 1,550 gigs as the training set. Since
we used the 1,550 gigs for training purposes, we removed
those gigs (and 299 other gigs associated with the users
that posted the 1,550 gigs) from the large dataset contain-
ing 89,667 gigs. After this filtering, the remaining 87,818
gigs were used as the testing set.
We built the SVM-based classifier with the training set
and predicted class labels of the gigs in the testing set.
19,904 of the 87,818 gigs were predicted as crowdturfing
gigs. Since this classification approach was evaluated in the
previous section and achieved high accuracy with a small
number of misclassifications for legitimate gigs, almost all
of these 19,904 gigs should be real crowdturfing gigs. To
make verify this conclusion, we manually scanned the titles
of all of these gigs and confirmed that our approach worked
well. Here are some examples of these gig titles: “I will 100+
Canada real facebook likes just within 1 day for $5”, “I will
send 5,000 USA only traffic to your website/blog for $5”,
and “I will create 1000 BACKLINKS guaranteed + bonus
for $5”.
To understand and visualize what terms crowdturfing gigs
often contain, we generated a word cloud of titles for these
Figure 5: Word cloud of crowdturfing gigs.
19,904 crowdturfing gigs. First, we extracted the titles of
the gigs and tokenized them to generate unigrams. Then,
we removed stop words. Figure 5 shows the word cloud of
crowdturfing gigs. The most popular terms are online social
network names (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), tar-
geted goals for the online social networks (e.g., likes and
followers), and search engine related terms (e.g., backlinks,
website, and Google). This word cloud also helps confirm
that our classifier accurately identified crowdturfing gigs.
Next, we are interested in analyzing the top 10 countries
of buyers and sellers in the crowdturfing gigs. Can we iden-
tify different country distributions compared with the dis-
tributions of the overall Fiverr sellers and buyers shown in
Figure 4? Are country distributions of sellers and buyers
in the crowdsourcing gigs in Fiverr different from distribu-
tion of users in other crowdsourcing sites? Interestingly, the
most frequent sellers of the crowdturfing gigs in Figure 6(a)
were from the United States (35.8%), following a similar
distribution as the overall Fiverr sellers. This distribution
is very different from another research result (Lee, Tamila-
rasan, and Caverlee 2013), in which the most frequent sellers
(called “workers” in that research) in another crowdsourc-
ing site, Microworkers.com, were from Bangladesh. This
observation might imply that Fiverr is more attractive than
Microworkers.com for U.S. residents since selling a gig on
Fiverr gives them higher profits (each gig costs at least $5
but only 50 cents at Microworkers.com). The country distri-
bution for buyers of the crowdturfing gigs in Figure 6(b) is
similar with the previous research result (Lee, Tamilarasan,
and Caverlee 2013), in which the majority of buyers (called
“requesters” in that research) were from English-speaking
countries. This is also consistent with the distribution of the
overall Fiverr buyers. Based on this analysis, we conclude
that the majority of buyers and sellers of the crowdturfing
gigs were from the U.S. and other western countries, and
these gigs targeted major web sites such as social media sites
and search engines.
Case Studies of 3 Types of Crowdturfing Gigs
From the previous section, the classifier detected 19,904
crowdturfing gigs. In this section, we classify these 19,904
gigs into the three crowdturfing gig groups in order to fea-
ture case studies for the three groups in detail. To further
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US
35.8%
India
11.5%
Bangladesh
6.5%
UK
5.9%
Pakistan
4.3%
Indonesia 3.8%
Canada 2.8%
Philippines 1.9%
Vietnam 1.8%
Germany 1.7%
Others
24%
US
51.6%
UK
10.5%
Canada
5.1%
Australia 4.1%
India 2.2%
Germany 1.9%
Israel 1.3%
Singapore 1.3%
Thailand 1.2%
Indonesia 1%
Others
19.8%
(a) Sellers.(a) Sellers ( ) 
US
35.8%
India
11.5%
Bangladesh
6.5%
UK
5.9%
Pakistan
4.3%
Indonesia 3.8%
Canada 2.8%
Phili pines 1.9%
Vietnam 1.8%
Germany 1.7%
Others
24%
US
51.6%
.
.
i gapore 1.3%
iland 1.2%
I esia 1%
(b) Buyers.
Figure 6: Top 10 countries of sellers and buyers in crowdturfing gigs.
classify the 19,904 gigs into three crowdturfing groups, we
built another classifier that was trained using the 121 crowd-
turfing gigs (used in the previous section), consisting of 65
social media targeting gigs, 47 search engine targeting gigs,
and 9 user traffic targeting gigs. The classifier classified the
19,904 gigs as 14,065 social media targeting gigs (70.7%),
5,438 search engine targeting gigs (27.3%), and 401 user
traffic targeting gigs (2%). We manually verified that these
classifications were correct by scanning the titles of the gigs.
Next, we will present our case studies for each of the three
types of crowdturfing gigs.
Social media targeting gigs. In Figure 7, we identify the
social media sites (including social networking sites) that
were targeted the most by the crowdturfing sellers. Over-
all, most well known social media sites were targeted by the
sellers. Among the 14,065 social media targeting gigs, 7,032
(50%) and 3,744 (26.6%) gigs targeted Facebook and Twit-
ter, respectively. Other popular social media sites such as
Youtube, Google+, and Instagram were also targeted. Some
sellers targeted multiple social media sites in a single crowd-
turfing gig. Example titles for these social media targeting
gigs are “I will deliver 100+ real fb likes from france to you
facebook fanpage for $5” and “I will provide 2000+ perfect
looking twitter followers without password in 24 hours for
$5”.
Search engine targeting gigs. People operating a company
always have a desire for their web site to be highly ranked in
search results generated by search engines such as Google
and Bing. The web site’s rank order affects the site’s profit
since web surfers (users) usually only click the top results,
and click-through rates of the top pages decline exponen-
tially from #1 to #10 positions in a search result (Moz 2013).
One popular way to boost the ranking of a web site is to
get links from other web sites because search engines mea-
sure a web site’s importance based on its link structure. If
a web site is cited or linked by a well known web site such
as cnn.com, the web site will be ranked in a higher position
than before. Google’s famous ranking algorithm, PageRank,
Figure 7: Social media sites targeted by the crowdturfing
sellers.
is computed based on the link structure and quality of links.
To artificially boost the ranking of web sites, search engine
targeting gigs provide a web site linking service. Example
titles for these gigs are “I will build a Linkwheel manually
from 12 PR9 Web20 + 500 Wiki Backlinks+Premium Index
for $5” and “I will give you a PR5 EDUCATION Nice per-
manent link on the homepage for $5”.
As shown in the examples, the sellers of these gigs shared
a PageRank score for the web pages that would be used to
link to buyers’ web sites. PageRank score ranges between
1 and 9, and a higher score means the page’s link is more
likely to boost the target page’s ranking. To understand what
types of web pages the sellers provided, we analyzed the ti-
tles of the search engine targeting gigs. Specifically, titles of
3,164 (58%) of the 5,438 search engine targeting gigs ex-
plicitly contained a PageRank score of their web pages so
Figure 8: PageRank scores of web pages managed by the
crowdturfing gig sellers and used to link to a buyer’s web
page.
we extracted PageRank scores from the titles and grouped
the gigs by a PageRank score, as shown in Figure 8. The
percentage of web pages between PR1 and PR4 increased
from 4.9% to 22%. Then, the percentage of web pages be-
tween PR5 and PR8 decreased because owning or managing
higher PageRank pages is more difficult. Surprisingly, the
percentage of PR9 web pages increased. We conjecture that
the buyers owning PR9 pages invested time and resources
carefully to maintain highly ranked pages because they knew
the corresponding gigs would be more popular than others
(and much more profitable).
User traffic targeting gigs. Web site owners want to in-
crease the number of visitors to their sites, called “user traf-
fic”, to maximize the value of the web site and its revenue.
Ultimately, they want these visitors buy products on the
site or click advertisements. For example, owners can earn
money based on the number of clicks on advertisements sup-
plied from Google AdSense (Google 2013). 401 crowdturf-
ing gigs fulfilled these owners’ needs by passing user traffic
to buyers’ web sites.
An interesting research question is, “How many visitors
does a seller pass to the destination site of a buyer?” To an-
swer this question, we analyzed titles of the 401 gigs and ex-
tracted the number of visitors by using regular expressions
(with manual verification). 307 of the 401 crowdturfing gigs
contained a number of expected visitors explicitly in their
titles. To visualize these numbers, we plotted the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) of the number of promised
visitors in Figure 9. While 73% of sellers guaranteed that
they will pass less than 10,000 visitors, the rest of the sell-
ers guaranteed that they will pass 10,000 or more visitors.
Even 2.3% of sellers advertised that they will pass more than
50,000 visitors. Examples of titles for these user traffic tar-
geting gigs are “I will send 7000+ Adsense Safe Visitors To
Your Website/Blog for $5” and “I will send 15000 real hu-
man visitors to your website for $5”. By only paying $5,
the buyers can get a large number of visitors who might buy
products or click advertisements on the destination site.
In summary, we identified 19,904 (22.2%) of the 89,667
gigs as crowdturfing tasks. Among those gigs, 70.7% tar-
geted social media sites, 27.3% targeted search engines, and
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Figure 9: The number of visitors (User Traffic) provided by
the sellers.
2% passed user traffic. The case studies reveal that crowd-
turfing gigs can be a serious problem to the entire web
ecosystem because malicious users can target any popular
web service.
Impact of Crowdturfing Gigs
Thus far, we have studied how to detect crowdturfing gigs
and presented case studies for three types of crowdturfing
gigs. We have also hypothesized that crowdturfing gigs pose
a serious threat, but an obvious question is whether they ac-
tually affect to the web ecosystem. To answer this question,
we measured the real world impact of crowdturfing gigs.
Specifically, we purchased a few crowdturfing gigs targeting
Twitter, primarily because Twitter is one of the most targeted
social media sites. A common goal of these crowdturfing
gigs is to send Twitter followers to a buyer’s Twitter account
(i.e., artificially following the buyer’s Twitter account) to in-
crease the account’s influence on Twitter.
To measure the impact of these crowdturfing gigs, we first
created five Twitter accounts as the target accounts. Each of
the Twitter accounts has a profile photo to pretend to be a
human’s account, and only one tweet was posted to each ac-
count. These accounts did not have any followers, and they
did not follow any other accounts to ensure that they are not
influential and do not have any friends. The impact of these
crowdturfing gigs was measured as a Klout score, which is a
numerical value between 0 and 100 that is used to measure a
user’s influence by Klout2. The higher the Klout score is, the
more influential the user’s Twitter account is. In this setting,
the initial Klout scores of our Twitter accounts were all 0.
Then, we selected five gigs that claimed to send followers
to a buyer’s Twitter account, and we purchased them, using
the screen names of our five Twitter accounts. Each of the
five gig sellers would pass followers to a specific one of our
Twitter accounts (i.e., there was a one seller to one buyer
mapping). The five sellers’ Fiverr account names and the ti-
tles of their five gigs are as follows:
spyguyz I will send you stable 5,000 Twitter FOLLOWERS
in 2 days for $5
2http://klout.com
Table 5: The five gigs’ sellers, the number of followers sent
by these sellers and the period time took to send all of these
followers.
Seller Name |Sent Followers| The Period of Time
spyguyz 5,502 within 5 hours
tweet retweet 33,284 within 47 hours
fiver expert 5,503 within 1 hour
sukmoglea4863 756 within 6 hours
myeasycache 1,315 within 1 hour
tweet retweet I will instantly add 32000 twitter followers
to your twitter account safely $5
fiver expert I will add 1000+ Facebook likes Or 5000+
Twitter follower for $5
sukmoglea4863 I will add 600 Twitter Followers for you,
no admin is required for $5
myeasycache I will add 1000 real twitter followers perma-
nent for $5
These sellers advertised sending 5,000, 32,000, 5,000,
600 and 1,000 Twitter followers, respectively. First, we mea-
sured how many followers they actually sent us (i.e., do they
actually send the promised number of followers?), and then,
we identify how quickly they sent the followers. Table 5
presents the experimental result. Surprisingly, all of the sell-
ers sent a larger number of followers than they originally
promised. Even tweet retweet sent almost 33,000 followers
for just $5. While tweet retweet sent the followers within
47 hours (within 2 days, as the seller promised), the other
four sellers sent followers within 6 hours (two of them sent
followers within 1 hour). In summary, we were able to get
a large number of followers (more than 45,000 followers in
total) by paying only $25, and these followers were sent to
us very quickly.
Next, we measured the impact of these artificial Twitter
followers by checking the Klout scores for our five Twitter
accounts (again, our Twitter accounts’ initial Klout scores
were 0). Specifically, after our Twitter accounts received the
above followers from the Fiverr sellers, we checked their
Klout scores to see whether artificially getting followers im-
proved the influence of our accounts. In Klout, the higher a
user’s Klout score is, the more influential the user is (Klout
2013). Surprisingly, the Klout scores of our accounts were
increased to 18.12, 19.93, 18.15, 16.3 and 16.74, which cor-
responded to 5,502, 33,284, 5,503, 756 and 1,316 followers.
From this experimental result, we learned that an account’s
Klout score is correlated with its number of followers, as
shown in Figure 10. Apparently, getting followers (even arti-
ficially) increased the Klout scores of our accounts and made
them more influential. In summary, our crowdsourced ma-
nipulations had a real world impact on a real system.
The Followers Suspended By Twitter. Another interest-
ing research question is, “Can current security systems de-
tect crowdturfers?”. Specifically, can Twitter’s security sys-
tem detect the artificial followers that were used for crowd-
sourced manipulation? To answer this question, we checked
how many of our new followers were suspended by the
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Figure 10: Klout scores of our five Twitter accounts were
correlated with number of followers of them.
Twitter Safety team two months after we collected them
through Fiverr. We accessed each follower’s Twitter profile
page by using Twitter API. If the follower had been sus-
pended by Twitter security system, the API returned the fol-
lowing error message: “The account was suspended because
of abnormal and suspicious behaviors”. Surprisingly, only
11,358 (24.6%) of the 46,176 followers were suspended af-
ter two months. This indicates that Twitter’s security sys-
tem is not effectively detecting these manipulative followers
(a.k.a. crowdturfers). This fact confirms that the web ecosys-
tem and services need our crowdturfing task detection sys-
tem to detect crowdturfing tasks and reduce the impact of
these tasks on other web sites.
Related Work
In this section, we introduce some crowdsourcing research
work which focused on understanding workers’ demo-
graphic information, filtering low quality answers and spam-
mers, and analyzing crowdturfing tasks and market.
Ross et al. (Ross et al. 2010) analyzed user demograph-
ics on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and found that the number
of non-US workers has been increased, especially led by In-
dian workers who were mostly young, well-educated males.
Heymann and Garcia-Molina (Heymann and Garcia-Molina
2011) proposed a novel analytics tool for crowdsourcing
systems to gather logging events such as workers’ location
and used browser type.
Other researchers studied how to control quality of crowd-
sourced work, aiming at getting high quality results and fil-
tering spammers who produce low quality answers. Venetis
and Garcia-Molina (Venetis and Garcia-Molina 2012) com-
pared various low quality answer filtering approaches such
as gold standard, plurality and work time, found that the
more number of workers participated in a task, the better
result was produced. Halpin and Blanco (Halpin and Blanco
2012) used a machine learning technique to detect spammers
at Amazon Mechanical Truck.
Researchers began studying crowdturfing problems and
market. Motoyama et al. (Motoyama et al. 2011) analyzed
abusive tasks on Freelancer. Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2012)
analyzed two Chinese crowdsourcing sites and estimated
that 90% of all tasks were crowdturfing tasks. Lee et al.
(Lee, Tamilarasan, and Caverlee 2013) analyzed three West-
ern crowdsourcing sites (e.g., Microworkers.com, Short-
Task.com and Rapidworkers.com) and found that mainly tar-
geted systems were online social networks (56%) and search
engines (33%). Recently, Stringhini et al. (Stringhini et al.
2013) and Thomas et al. (Thomas et al. 2013) studied Twit-
ter follower market and Twitter account market, respectively.
Compared with the previous research work, we collected
a large number of active tasks in Fiverr and analyzed crowd-
turfing tasks among them. We then developed crowdturfing
task detection classifiers for the first time and effectively de-
tected crowdturfing tasks. We measured the impact of these
crowdturfing tasks in Twitter. This research will complement
the existing research work.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive analy-
sis of gigs and users in Fiverr and identified three types of
crowdturfing gigs: social media targeting gigs, search en-
gine targeting gigs and user traffic targeting gigs. Based on
this analysis, we proposed and developed statistical classifi-
cation models to automatically differentiate between legiti-
mate gigs and crowdturfing gigs, and we provided the first
study to detect crowdturfing tasks automatically. Our exper-
imental results show that these models can effectively detect
crowdturfing gigs with an accuracy rate of 97.35%. Using
these classification models, we identified 19,904 crowdturf-
ing gigs in Fiverr, and we found that 70.7% were social me-
dia targeting gigs, 27.3% were search engine targeting gigs,
and 2% were user traffic targeting gigs. Then, we presented
detailed case studies that identified important characteristics
for each of these three types of crowdturfing gigs.
Finally, we measured the real world impact of crowdturf-
ing by purchasing active Fiverr crowdturfing gigs that tar-
geted Twitter. The purchased gigs generated tens of thou-
sands of artificial followers for our Twitter accounts. Our
experimental results show that these crowdturfing gigs have
a tangible impact on a real system. Specifically, our Twitter
accounts were able to attain increased (and undeserved) in-
fluence on Twitter. We also tested Twitter’s existing security
system to measure its ability to detect and remove the arti-
ficial followers we obtained through crowdturfing. Surpris-
ingly, after two months, the Twitter Safety team was only
able to successfully detect 25% of the artificial followers.
This experimental result illustrates the importance of our
crowdturfing gig detection study and the necessity of our
crowdturfing detection classifiers for detecting and prevent-
ing crowdturfing tasks. Ultimately, we hope to widely de-
ploy our system and reduce the impact of these tasks to other
sites in advance.
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